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Abstract: The study aimed to advance the traditional issue of identifying decision strategy by analyzing the information 
processing in terms of visual exploration patterns. Twenty-seven participants played as responders in a computerized ver-
sion of Ultimatum Game with an anonymous virtual partner. 
Responders tended to reject unfair offers, probably due to their taste for fairness and to the unidentifiability of the other 
player that reduced the willingness to cooperate. Furthermore, according to the evolutionary approach, participants fo-
cused their attention more at themselves than at the partner. Among the three type of offers – hyperfair, fair and unfair –
mid-value offers, such as fair ones, required more number of fixations and fixations duration, related to the more complex 
cognitive and reasoning processes involved.  
Implications of this study could be applied in decisional settings with anonymous partners, such as those online, with fu-
ture studies confirming the results found and integrating them through other process tracing methodologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The understanding of human decision-making is a fasci-
nating and challenging issue requiring the contribute of sev-
eral disciplines, such as economics, psychology and neuro-
science [1]. The economic perspective grounds on the classi-
cal theory of decision-making, assuming that people should 
behave rationally, maximizing gains and minimizing losses 
[2]. According to this view, economists have developed de-
tailed theoretical models for dealing with many decision 
situations that have the virtue of being formally explicit and 
that aim to make quantitatively precise predictions about 
decision-making in a wide range of circumstances.  
 However, psychological research on judgment and deci-
sion-making has experimentally shown that these models do 
not provide a complete and satisfactory description of human 
behavior [3]. In particular, as strongly supported by recent 
findings from neuroeconomics, decision-making, as other 
human behaviors, has to be viewed not as the product of a 
single process, but rather as the result of the interaction of 
different specialized subsystems [1, 4, 5]. According to this 
perspective and referring to the well-known distinction be-
tween automatic and controlled processes [6, 7], recently 
researchers have provided evidence for two systems,  
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competing for control in inference making and action: the 
instinctive affective system - System 1 - and the controlled 
deliberative system – System 2 [8-11]. System 1 is automatic 
parallel, affectively charged, it employs heuristic-based 
processes and it includes fast and instinctive processes 
formed by associative learning methods that operate largely 
beyond awareness. On the other hand, System 2 is con-
trolled, rule-based, slow, serial, deliberative and it is con-
strained by working memory capacity. Furthermore, if the 
operations involved in controlled processes are often acces-
sible to introspective and explicit description, those involved 
in automatic processes are usually much less so.  
 Among methodologies used to identify decisions strat-
egy, eye tracking plays an important role. This methodology 
has been traditionally adopted by psychological researchers 
following the eye–mind assumption [12, 13] to record eye 
movements considered as immediate cues to attention and 
cognitive process. Although few years ago the application of 
eye movements to infer decision strategies has not been 
popular, probably due to its high costs and poor perform-
ance, today advances in eye tracking technology have al-
lowed for precise analysis of the temporal information con-
tained in the eye movement record [14]. Eye movements are 
fast and natural and the application of the eye tracker in the 
decision-making research lies on the assumption that, where 
participants are allowed to freely explore the decision infor-
mation, they sample information by considering several as-
pects of the interpersonal relationships management, among 
which reciprocity, by directing their gaze to them [15, 16]. 
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 The increase of eye tracking application to decision mak-
ing analysis [16] has led to the development of several mod-
els aimed to describe the eyes’ behavior during the informa-
tion processing [17-20]. Two leading models are those of 
Shimojo and colleagues [17, 19, 21] and of Russo and Le-
clerc [20]. Shimojo and colleagues [17, 19, 21] formulated 
the Gaze Cascade Model by focusing on two component 
processes related to looking behavior that interact during 
preference decisions. The first process is preferential look-
ing, where the person tends to look longer at the stimulus 
that he/she likes. The second process is the mere exposure 
effect, where merely looking at a stimulus increases prefer-
ence for that stimulus [22-25]. Russo and Leclerc [20] identi-
fied two stages of processing more focused on attentive and 
evaluative components: in particular, initial looks reflected 
orientation and screening functions and additional looks re-
flected more evaluative processes. 
 The goal of this study is to analyze the information proc-
essing during a decision task typically employed to explore 
decision making behavior, the Ultimatum Game – UG [26]. 
In this game, two players have to split a sum of money. One 
person acts as proposer, who suggests how the money should 
be divided between the players. The second person plays as 
responder and has to decide whether to accept or reject the 
offer. If the responder accepts the offer, the sum is divided as 
proposed. If the responder rejects the offer, neither partici-
pant receives anything. 
 Whereas standard economic models would predict that 
proposer should make the smallest possible offer to maxi-
mize his/her gain and responder should accept all non-zero 
offers actually players violate this economic assumption [5, 
27, 28]. A common explanation of this discrepancy is that 
the responders’ rejection expresses their “taste for fairness” 
and that therefore they rather forgo some money than being 
treated unfairly [29-33]. Besides the taste for fairness, other 
factors have been claimed to explain such a discrepancy: 
among the most studied, physical appearance [34], intention-
ality [35-37], mentalizing [38, 39], morality [40], social roles 
[41, 42] and framing effects related to different types of de-
scriptions of the proposer [33]. 
 To control these confounding variables, we proposed 
anonymous and unidentifiable proposers [43], which corre-
sponds to those conditions where people cannot identify per-
sonal details concerning their partners. 
 Specifically, we aimed at testing two principal hypothe-
ses: 
1. There are relationships between the visual information 
processing patterns and the decision making outcomes 
(acceptance vs rejection). 
2. There are differences between the visual information 
processing patterns related to the fairness of the offers 
and those related to the players.  
MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY 
Participants  
 Thirty female undergraduate students from the Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milano (age range 19-22 years) 
participated in this study. All subjects were healthy and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 We excluded participants that were Psychology or Econ-
omy students for their familiarity with the decisional con-
structs, or that had previously taken part in an Ultimatum 
Game. 
 Participants with missing data were deleted from the 
analyses, resulting in a total of 27 participants. 
Procedure and Task 
 Participants were seated in front of the computer and an 
initial calibration pattern was displayed to them before run-
ning the eye-tracker (Tobii Eye-Tracker X120) session. After 
having signed an informed consent form and received writ-
ten instructions, participants performed the task that con-
sisted of a computerized version of the Ultimatum Game 
where proposers were anonymous and participants played as 
responders.  
 The rule of the game has been explained to participants; 
the sum to be splitted was 10 euro. Participants were also 
informed that at the end of the game their acceptance rates 
would have been converted in a shopping voucher with the 
maximum value of 10 euro.  
 Nine offer conditions (9-1, 8-2, 7-3, 6-4, 5-5, 4-6, 3-7, 2-
8, 1-9) were presented in a randomized order. Each offer was 
repeated 4 times with the order of the players counterbal-
anced (see Fig. 1), yielding a total of 36 trials. These ma-
nipulations were adopted to ensure that the participant would 
 
Fig. (1). Two examples of offers where the order of the players was counterbalanced. 
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not form any kind of response bias derived from location-
based information about the offers. 
 The offer was shown for an interval of 7000ms (phase 1), 
then a white cross on the centre of the screen against a blank 
background was presented for 2000ms (phase 2). Respond-
ers’ decisions were communicated orally. In this way we 
controlled the two decision making phases: the decisional 
process (eye movements, phase 1) and the choice (behavioral 
outcomes, phase 2). Analysis was based on the trials repre-
senting “unfair” (9-1, 8-2, 7-3,), “fair” (6-4, 5-5, 4-6) and 
“hyperfair” (3-7, 2-8, 1-9) offers. 
 Each Eye-tracker registration session lasted approxi-
mately 10 minutes.  
MEASURES 
Decision Making Outcomes 
 At the moment of presentation of the white cross on the 
centre of the screen against a blank background (phase 2), 
responders communicated orally their decisions, related to 
offer acceptation or rejection, by saying “yes” or “no”. The 
experimenter registered responders’ decision by filling in an 
appropriate table. If the offer was accepted, the sum was 
divided as proposed. If the offer was rejected, none of the 
participants received anything.  
Eye-Tracking Data Acquisition and Model Analysis 
 The categories responsible for drawing attention to spe-
cific Regions of Interest – ROI (salient regions of an image) 
were the amount of money received by each player (Self, i.e. 
the responder, and Other, i.e. the proposer) and the entity of 
the offer (Unfair, Fair and Hyperfair).  
 Eye-movement indicators have been processed in terms 
of number and duration of fixations. Fixations referred to the 
positioning of a target of interest on the fovea for a variable 
period of time.  
 On the one hand, according to authors claiming that ex-
ploratory visual behaviour reflects in longer looks at the at-
tractive objects [44] and to the exposure effect, such as the 
fact that merely looking at a stimulus increases preference 
for that stimulus [19, 22-25], we considered fixations dura-
tion as indicator of interest and preference towards the ob-
ject. On the other hand, according to Russo and Leclerc [20] 
stating that initial looks reflected orientation and screening 
functions and additional looks reflected more evaluative 
processes, we considered fixations number as indicator of 
the cognitive evaluation during the decision. 
RESULTS 
Decision Making Outcomes and Relationship with Visual 
Information Processing  
 The acceptance was significantly different [F(2, 25)= 
79.545, p<.001) among the three offer’s conditions: hyper-
fair and fair offers were accepted more than unfair ones (re-
spectively, p<.001 and p<.001) (Fig. 2). 
 According to the first hypothesis, we found only a posi-
tive correlation between the acceptance of unfair offers and 
fixations duration on the ROI of the Other (Spearman’s Rho 
Coefficient = .430, p<.05). 
Visual Information Processing Behavior Related to Fair-
ness and Player 
 A 2x3 ANOVA was performed to test the second hy-
pothesis and we found main effects related to both the player 
and the offers’ entity. Responders directed and maintained 
their gaze to themselves. As shown in Table 1, both Fixa-
tions duration and Fixations number were significantly 
higher towards the ROI of Self than the ROI of Other. 
 Furthermore, responders looked significantly more fair 
than unfair offers in terms of fixations duration [M= 26.42 vs 
M= 24.82, F(2, 25)= 4.316, p<.05] and more fair than hyper-
fair offers [M= 51.33 vs M= 47.80, F(2, 25)= 4.318, p<.05) 
in terms of fixations number. 
 
Fig. (2). Ratings of acceptance and rejection related to offer’s conditions. 
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 We found also interaction effects between player and 
offer’s entity for each visual processing indicator. In particu-
lar: 
- more fixations duration towards the self with fair 
(M=30.02, p<.005) and hyperfair (M=30.94, p<.001) 
than unfair offers [M= 27.33, F(2,25)= 13.693]; 
- more fixations number towards the other with fair 
(M=46.89, p<.05) and unfair (M=45.23, p<.05) than hy-
perfair offers [M= 41.48, F(2,25)= 6.003]. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This study aimed to investigate the decision-making 
process within the context of the Ultimatum Game by ana-
lyzing the information processing in terms of visual explora-
tion patterns.  
 Behavioral outcomes are coherent with the psychological 
approach to decision-making analysis, because players tend 
to accept mainly the offers which they judge as fair or hyper-
fair and to reject offer which they judge as unfair [9]. Litera-
ture suggests that the responders’ rejection expresses their 
“taste for fairness” [29-31] and a plausible interpretation is 
also related to the role played by the unidentifiability of the 
partner that reduces willingness to cooperate [45, 46].  
 With respect to the first hypothesis, it was partially sup-
ported. We found just a relationship between the pattern of 
acceptance of unfair offers and fixations duration towards 
the other. This result is coherent with the exposure effect 
proposed by Simion and colleagues [19]. Participants made 
longer looks at the unfair offers and this is associated to an 
increase of preference for these offers. Probably this is the 
case of few players that, according to the standard economic 
theory, accept unfair offers. As suggested by the neuro-
economic approach, strategic interactions between individu-
als involve an interplay between emotion and deliberation. 
This interplay has been shown particularly active when par-
ticipant is confronted with un unfair offer [1] and could have 
been led responders to direct higher fixations duration to-
wards the other. 
 With respect to the second hypothesis, as far as players 
are concerned, we found that responders directed and main-
tained their gaze more on themselves than on the partner 
both in terms of number and duration of fixations. A possible 
explanation of this result could be traced back to the evolu-
tionary approach [47, 48]. The individual - called to make a 
decision that can have favourable as well as disadvantageous 
effects - primarily evaluates his/her potential profit. This is 
probably just the first step of a complex decisional process, 
which starts online with an attitude of self-orientation and 
then evolves in an attempt to reconcile the mere self-interest 
with the delicate balances of social and relational dynamics 
(see for example, [49]).  
 As far as the offers are concerned, participants made 
longest fixations and highest number of fixations towards 
fair offers. This result seems to confirm the different roles 
played by the instinctive- affective system - System 1 - and 
the controlled - deliberative system – System 2 (8-11). In-
stinctively, participants spend less fixations duration and less 
number of fixations on hyperfair and unfair offers, while 
they look more mid-value offers, such are as the fair ones in 
this context, that require more complex cognitive and rea-
soning processes.  
 Interaction effects also confirmed the activation of the 
System 1: responders instinctively look more towards them-
selves when they received fair and hyperfair offers and they 
look more towards the other when they received fair and 
unfair offers, perhaps signaling interest and positive emo-
tions towards the self in case of personal advantage and 
showing that fairness represents the balancing point between 
the self and the other.  
 The implications of this study are particularly interesting 
for decisional settings characterized by the presence of 
anonymous partners, such as those online. Developing trust 
and reciprocity is a challenge in peer-to-peer e-commerce 
where interactions are frequently anonymous and they lack 
information to assess the trustworthiness of e-vendors. It 
seems that in case of fully favourable or unfavourable offers, 
such as hyperfair or unfair ones, people make easily their 
decision and they don’t need other information. Mid-value 
offers, such as fair ones, support the importance of reputa-
tion in e-commerce [50]: with similar offers people could 
make their decision by considering the reputation of e-
vendors. 
 Although the results seem promising, they need to be 
viewed cautiously because of two limitations: the sample 
size and the gender distribution of the sample. Future studies 
should include both male population and combine the analy-
ses of eye movements with other process tracing techniques, 
such as verbal protocol techniques (16). 
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